1. The Responsiveness of Legislators to Non-Partisan Constituents: A Field Experiment (with Thomas Gschwend, Thomas Zittel, and Steffen Zittlau).

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  1. Summary: We report a field experiment for which we sent an information request to German legislators on behalf of a constituent who specifically signalled not being one of their partisans. We find that legislators randomly treated with a demand for personal representation are more responsive than those who receive a demand for party representation, and that this treatment effect is larger among legislators elected in a nominal district.

Observational methods

  1. A Mixed-utility Theory of Vote Choice Regret (with André Blais and Jean-François Laslier).

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  1. Summary: We depart from a surprising survey result: an non-negligible proportion of voters declares regretting their vote choice in the week that directly follows the election. We show that this can be rationalized when we consider that voters are maximizing a mixed-utility, composed of both instrumental and expressive benefits. We validate our theory using pre- and post-election panel survey data from Canada.

  1. Voting and Satisfaction with Democracy in Flexible-List PR Systems (with André Blais, Xavier Girard, Lidia Nunez, and Jean-Benoit Pilet).

  1. Summary: We use a pre- and post-election panel survey data from Belgium to estimate the effect of casting a party-list vote compard to a preference vote for individual candidates in flexible-list PR systems. We find that party-list voters are slightly more satisfied than those voting for winning candidates, and substantially more than those voting for losing candidates. Further, we show that party-list voters are as satisfied as the most satisfied preference voters.

  1. Does Inequality Harm Democracy? The Inclusion and Representation of the Poor in Europe (with Marco Giani).

  2. [PDF]

  1. Summary: We use coarsened exact matching and survey data from 30 elections and 15  countries (N ≈ 55,000) to evaluate whether (1) the poor vote less than the rich, and (2) whether abstainers would vote differently than the rest of the population . We show that there is a severe problem of inclusion of the poor in the electoral process, but that it only affects the representation of the electoral outcome in some of them, and not always in the expected direction.